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Case No. 9120 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
s·TATE OF UTAH 
STERLING JACOBSON and liN-~ L E D 
TRAL UT:A-H BLOCK COMPANY, ri~ · R 2 8 1960 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Responden)i~i,~;;:.~· s~;;;:~-;;;~--c~~ri:··u·i~;;----
-vs.-
RALPH MEMMOTT, 1\1:ERRILL G. ~ 
MEMMOTT, GRACE K. MEMMOTT 
and MARIE S. MEMMOTT, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Intermediate Appeal from the District ·Court of the 
Fifth Judicial District in and for Millard County. 
Honorable Maurice Harding, Judge 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & 
MATTSSON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STERLING JACOBSON and CEN-
TRAL UTAH BLOCK CO~iP ANY, 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
RALPH MEl\iMOTT, MERRILL G. 
~IE:\LMOTT, GRACE K. MEMMOTT 
and :MARIE S. MEJ\IMOTT, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 
9120 
This is a condemnation proceeding to secure to plain-
tiffs a surface right-of-way across defendants' mining 
property in order to facilitate the mining of plaintiffs' 
property, which property is adjacent to that of the de-
fendants. Believing, as we do, that defendants ( appell-
ants herein) have misconceived the issues, and in order 
that the same be more precisely stated, it is appropriate 
to restate the facts. 
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STATEl\1ENT OF FACTS 
Defendants have been pennitted to take an inter-
rnediate appeal from an order of the District Court of 
Millard County, Utah, entered on July 10, 1959 (R. 
28-32), denying defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' 
complaint as the same was further amended at the 
hearing reflected by the order. The arnended complaint 
(R. 12-13) denominates the plaintiff's mining claim as 
the "Red Robin" and the defendants' adjoining mining 
claim as the "Red I-Iill." The amendments permitted by 
the trial court are set forth in the order of July 10, 
1959, and are incorporated in the amended cmnplaint 
by reference. In other words, the amended complaint 
and the order permitting the further amendments must 
be read together to determine the propriety of the 
motion to dismiss. Furthermore, the order appealed 
from permitted plaintiffs to further amend by adding 
as Exhibit 4 the map showing the course of the center 
line of the present existing roadway across defendants' 
claim. 
The order of July 10, 1959, grants to plaintiffs a 
surface right-of-way to be used jointly with the de-
fendants across the existing roadway upon the condition 
"that when it becomes necessary for the defendants to 
mine the cinders lying under said right-of-way, and 
upon reasonable notice from the defendants, plaintiffs 
will move said right-of-way to smne other feasible place 
over defendants' claim" (R. 31-32). The amendments 
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3 
to the amended complaint as reflected in the July lOth 
order are: 
(Paragraph 5) 
"Plaintiffs are entitled to have a right-of-way 
for the purposes hereinbefore set forth over the 
premises known as the Red 1-lill :ro.Jining Claim 
for the purposes of transporting their ore and 
supplies to and from the 1nining operations over 
the present existing road, which is approxilnately 
one rod wide, or if defendants so desire, over 
the present and proposed road that should be 
approximately the same "'idth, and which road 
or roads 1nay be used jointly by the occupants 
or individuals joining Red Hill Mining Clain1, 
and that plaintiffs will move from the present 
existing road to any other feasible road across 
defendants' 1nining claim upon receiving reason-
able notice to do so and having an opportunity 
to construct such road when it becomes necessary 
for defendants to mine the cinders lying unde.r 
said road or roads." (R. 28-29) 
(Paragraph 3 of the prayer) 
"That upon the payment of the value of the 
same plaintiffs be granted a perpetual right of 
way and easement over and across said lands as 
set forth in the complaint, provided, however, 
that if it becomes necessary in the mining opera-
tions of defendants' claims to remove the material 
under said right-of-way that upon reasonable no-
tice, plaintiffs will move the right-of-way to any 
other feasible place over defendants' claim." 
(R. 29) 
Defendants contend (a) that their property is al-
ready appropriated to the same public use proposed 
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by plaintiffs, and. (b) the cornplaint does not specify 
the land to be condemned but sets forth a claim to a 
"floating" or "variable" right-of-way, and therefore the 
action should be dismissed. 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE CLAIM THAT DEFENDANTS' PROPERTY IS AL-
READY APPROPRIATED TO A PUBLIC USE REQUIRING 
PROOF BY PLAINTIFFS OF A MORE NECESSARY PUB-
LI·C USE MISCONCEIVES THE ISSUE INVOLVED. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AS AMENDED BY THE 
ORDER OF JULY 10, 1959, STATES A CLAIM UPON WHICH 
RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. 
ARGU~iENT 
POINT I. 
THE CLAIM THAT DEFENDANTS' PROPERTY IS AL-
READY APPROPRIATED TO A PUBLIC USE REQUIRING 
PROOF BY PLAINTIFFS OF A MORE NECESSARY PUB-
LIC USE MISCONCEIVES THE ISSUE INVOLVED. 
Unless it be the existing roadway, there is no sug-
gestion in this case that any of defendants' property 
is devoted to public use within the connotation of Sub-
section (3) of Section 78-34-3, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, which reads : 
"The private property which may be taken 
under this chapter includes: 
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( 3) Property appropriated to public use; 
provided, that such property shall not be taken 
unless for a more necessary public use than that 
to which it has been already appropriated." 
The right-of-wa~· granted by the order appealed 
from is centered along a present existing roadway on 
defendants' property, the right to be used in comnwn 
with the defendants. Assuming for the purpose of ar-
gument that the present roadway has becmne dedicated 
or appropriated to public use, the plaintiffs are not 
proposing a taking which is inconsistent or in inter-
ference with or an impairment of the first taking, and 
there defendants' arguinent is not applicable. In 2 Lewis 
Eminent Domain, Section 4-tl, Third Edition, it is said: 
"The general rule is founded upon the pre-
suinption that the legislature did not intend, by 
a general grant of the eininent domain power, 
to authorize an interference with the enjoyment 
of property devoted to public use under prior 
grants of the same power. A taking which is no 
interference present or prospective with the prior 
use, is not within the rule. Consequently it is 
generally held that an easement or joint use may 
be appropriated, where the two uses are not in-
consistent and the second is no interference with 
or impairment of the first. Taking an easement 
for a telegraph or telephone line upon a railroad 
right of way is a familiar example.'' 
In Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water & Elec. 
Power Co., 24 Utah 249, 67 P. 672, it is said: 
"Under the statutes of eminent domain 
the law seems to be well settled that, where two 
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public uses can stand together without material 
impairment or impediment of one by the other, 
they must so stand. This court so held in Postal 
TeL Cable Co. v. Oregon S. L. R. Co., 23 Utah 
474, 65 Pac. 735. In deciding a like question in 
the case of Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston 
& ,V. R. Corp., 23 Pick. 360, Mr. Chief Justice 
Shaw said: 'Both uses may well stand together, 
with some interference of the later with the 
earlier, which may be compensated for in dam-
ages.' Lewis, Em. Dom. Section 27 4; ~fining oCo. 
v. Corcoran, 15 Nev. 147; Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 
How. 507, 12 L. Ed. 535; In re Towanda Bridge 
Co., 91 Pa. 216; Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Hart-
ford & N.H.R. Co., 17 Conn. 454, -1-1 A1n. Dec. 556." 
The Utah statute was construed in Freeman Gulch 
Min. Co. v. J(ennecott Copper Corp. (10 Cir., 1941), 119 
F.2d 16: 
"A statute granting the right of eminent do-
main for a particular purpose must be liberally 
construed in furtherance of such purpose. Mone-
taire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol. 
Mining Co., 53 Utah 413, 174 P. 172, 175. 
While we think the facts demonstrate beyond 
question that the use for which Kennecott seeks 
condemnation is a more necessary public use 
than the use to which the property is being de-
voted by Freeman, the question of greater neces-
sity is not involved where the condemner seeks 
the right to use the property in common with 
the present owner thereof. Monetaire Mining Co. 
v. Columbus Rexall Consol. Mining Company, 
supra, 174 P. 176. 
We shall assume, but not decide, that the 
property here . sought to .be condemned is now 
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devoted to a public use. It is well settled that 
property devoted to one public use may, under 
general statutory authority, be taken for another 
public use, where the taking will not materially 
iinpair or interfere with, or is not inconsistent 
with the use already existing. Such a taking is 
expressly authorized by Section 104-61-3 ( 5) ." 
In Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon S.L.R. Co., 23 
Utah 474, 65 P. 735, the contest was between the Postal 
Company and the Railway Company, the former seek-
ing a right-of-way for a pole line upon the railroad 
right-of-way. In holding that the reference to the rail-
road bed is a sufficient description under the statute, 
and that the business of telegraphy is obviously a 
public business and that the Postal Company had the 
right to exercise the power of eminent domain, the 
Court stated, as between the two possible conflicting uses 
of the property sought to be condemned, the following: 
"It is contended by appellant that the re-
spondent had no power to locate its telegraph 
line longitudinally upon appellant's right of way, 
because, when the lands have been once taken, 
by virtue of the power of eminent domain or 
otherwise, and appropriated to a public use, as 
is the right of way in controversy, such land can-
not again be subjected to another public use, 
unless such secondary appropriation be author-
ized by the legislature. The authorities, however, 
affirm that this rule only applies when the second 
public use, by reason of its nature or character, 
necessarily supersedes or destroys the former 
use.'' 
In the instant case the existing roadway over the 
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defendants' mining claim, if appropriated to public use, 
is to be used in common with defendants for the same 
purposes, namely: that of transporting ore and supplies, 
a use which does not supersede or destroy the former 
use. The early case of Highland Boy Gold Min. Co. v. 
Strickley, 28 Utah 215, 78 P. 296, holds that the con-
struction and operation of roads for the development 
and working of mines is a public use, the Court stating 
in part: 
"Now, it is of vital importance to the people 
that the coal, as well as the Dther hidden resources 
of the state, be opened up and developed, and 
that the mining industry in general, which has 
been the source of so much wealth to the people 
of this and other Western states, be conducted 
on the sarne extensive scale in the future that has 
characterized its operations in the past. There-
fore the public policy of the state, as exemplified 
by the act of the Legislature under consideration, 
is to encourage the people to open up and exploit 
the mines with which the state abounds, and there-
by not only give to the state the wealth which will 
enable other industries to be created, but furnish 
thousands of laborers with remunerative employ-
rnent. 
It being conceded, and this court having held, 
that the construction and operation of irrigating 
ditches in this state is a public use (Nash v. Clark, 
27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371), it follows that the con-
struction of roads and tramways for the develop-
ment of the mining industry is a public use, as 
the same line of reasoning that applies in sup-
port of the doctrine in the one case holds good 
in the other." 
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Defendants' resistance to the use by the plaintiffs 
of the present existing roadway implies a private use 
and one that they might discontinue at their pleasure. 
In this regard 2 Lewis Eminent Domain, Section 445, 
Third Edition, states: 
"Property of individuals and private eorpor-
ations devoted to a use of a public nature for 
which the power of eminent domain might be 
exercised, but which use is purely voluntary and 
may be discontinued at the pleasure of the owner, 
is subject to condemnation under a general power 
the same as if devoted to private uses." 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AS AMENDED BY THE 
ORDER OF JULY 10, 1959, STATES A CLAIM UPON WHICH 
RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. 
Subsection (5) of Section 78-34-3, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, containing the language that all rights-of-way 
for the purposes mentioned in Section 78-34-1, which 
latter section permits the exercise of the right of emi-
nent don1ain for roads to facilitate the working of mines 
or mineral deposits, and Subsection ( 1) of Section 78-
34-2 to the effect that when the surface ground is 
underlaid with minerals sufficiently valuable to justify 
extraction a perpetual easement may be taken only 
over the surface ground over such deposits, and the 
last portion of Subsection ( 5) of Section 78-34-3 "but 
such uses of crossings, intersections and connections 
shall be made in the manner most compatible with the 
greatest public benefit and the least private injury," 
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invite the amendment to paragraph 5 of the complaint 
permitted by the July lOth order (R. 28-32). 
Defendants say that the amendment contemplates 
"a floating or variable right-of-way" and therefore the 
complaint as amended does not state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. On the contrary, the amend-
ment is calculated to mitigate the damage and injury 
to the defendants. It recognizes the joint use of the 
present existing road and permits a change upon rea-
sonable notice by the defendants when it becomes neces-
sary for thmn to mine the cinders underlying the existing 
road, the court to then determine another feasible 
right-of-way across defendants' property. Said Section 
78-34-2(1) pennits only a surface right under the cir-
cumstances indicated and by necessary implication per-
mits the mining of the underlying minerals by the 
defendants, leaving to the resourcefulness of a court of 
equity within its inherent power to devise a rule flexible 
and elastic enough to fairly and justly meet the cir-
cumstances of the case. This is what the trial court 
did by permitting the an1endment. 
Defendants cite Tripp v. Bagley, 7-! Utah 57, 276 
P. 912, to the effect that an easement once selected 
cannot be changed by either the lando·wner or the ease-
ment owner without mutual consent. The Trvpp case is 
not in point and deals primarily with the establishment 
of boundary lines by acquiescence over a long period 
of time. Furthermore, the amendment to the complaint 
in the instant case does not suggest any arbitrary 
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or coercive right on the part of the plaintiffs, but 
recognizes the comprehensive and equitable power of 
the court to make such changes in the surface right-
of-way as may be feasible upon the defendants desiring 
to mine the underlying mineral, if any there be. 
From their brief defendants seem to be prejudging 
their position with respect to damages, an issue ex-
pressly reserved by the trial court in the July lOth 
order. They lose sight of the fact that the statute con-
templates a joint user of the right-of-way and an equit-
able method of determining the compensation based 
upon all of the known facts and circumstances and such 
as to reflect justice in the instant case. The joint use 
and inherent power of the court to devise a fonnula 
for compensation based upon the realities of each case 
is clearly recognized by this ·Court in M onetaire M tning 
Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol. Mines Co., 53 Utah 413, 
17 ± P. 172, where the Court stated: 
"Counsel, however, state that there is no way 
to determine what the compensation shall be to 
the owner. It is, however, well settled that, where 
property may be condemned for the purpose of 
a joint use or a use in common, the whole matter 
of determining what is a reasonable compensation 
under all the circumstances, as well as the regu-
lations respecting the use of the property, is 
determined and regulated according to the rules 
of equity. 2 Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d Ed.) 
Section 423. 
• • • 
In view that the business of mining is neces-
sarily highly speculative ; that the prices- of most 
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metals are fluctuating so that to mine a certain 
grade of ore may be profitable this year while 
the price may be so much lower the next that it 
would be ruinous to attempt to mine it; that the 
contemplated ore bodies 1nay be much smaller in 
extent than was expected; and numerous other 
things that might be mentioned - the joint use 
of a mining tunnel of necessity must be temporary 
only. It is for that reason that some equitable 
method of determining and fixing the compensa-
tion for the joint use must be devised which must 
be based upon all the known facts and circum-
stances, and must be such as to reflect justice 
in each case. To fix the compensation in a lump 
sum might defeat the very end in view. Some just 
method of compensation is all the law contem-
plates, and that is all that can be required in 
each case. It is manifest that in this case no 
effort whatever was made by appellant and re-
spondent to arrive at an understanding regarding 
either the character or extent of compensation, 
nor with regard to the nature and extent of the 
use of the tunnel by appellant; and it is equally 
manifest that so long as the respondent can 
treat the tunnel in question as its own private 
affair, to which no one may gain access except 
by its consent, no such an understanding or 
agreen1ent is possible." 
Consistent \Yith the foregoing is the recent expres-
sion by this Court in re W nter Rights of Escalante Val-
ley Drainage Area, ________ Ptah ........ , 348 P.2d 679 (Feb. 
26, 1960 Advance Sheet), states: 
"The inherent power always exists in a Court 
of equity for devising new and more adequate 
remedies if the facts of the case justify such 
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action, and does not conflict with the law. The 
equitable jurisdiction of the court is and should 
be flexible, elastic enough to meet changing con-
ditions and problems.'' 
CONCLUSION 
The JJI onetaire 1lli,ning Co. case, supra, which recog-
nizes the joint use of a mining tunnel, the use of which 
of necessity must be temporary, coupled with the ex-
pre~sions of this Court in recognizing the inherent power 
of the trial court to make its orders and decrees flexible 
and elastic enough to Ineet changing conditions and 
problems, and the recognition by the legislature that 
the exercise of the right of eminent domain must be 
compatible with the greatest public benefit and the 
least private injury, answers the important question 
in this case dealing with the propriety of the amend-
ments complained of. The order of July 10, 1959, dis-
closes a conscientious judicial approach to the practical 
solution of an awkward problem, leaving a just method 
of compensation for future determination. 
The order appealed from should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & 
MATTSSON, 
Attorneys for Plaint~ffs and 
Respondents 
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